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After the Dodd-Frank Industrial Loan Company
Moratorium: What's Next?
V. GERARD COMIZIO*
1. INTRODUCTION

One of the many provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)1 that has
wide-ranging implications for the financial services industry is section
603 of Title VI, 2 which imposes a three year moratorium on the
chartering or acquisition of industrial loan companies (ILCs) by
commercial firms. The upcoming expiration of this moratorium on July
21, 2013 has reopened the debate on the future of the ILC.
ILCs, also known as industrial banks, are state-chartered
banking institutions that emerged in the early twentieth century
operating more or less as financial companies providing consumer
credit to low and moderate income workers who were generally
otherwise unable to obtain credit from commercial banks. 3

As a

* Mr. Comizio is a partner at Paul Hastings LLP, in its Washington, D.C. office, and chair
of the Global Banking and Payment Systems Practice group, and regularly represents
financial institutions on a wide range of regulatory, transactional and enforcement matters.
Mr. Comizio is a member of the board of advisors of the UNC School of Law's Center for
Banking and Finance. My thanks to Lissa L. Broome, the Wells Fargo Professor of Banking
Law and Director of the Center for Banking and Finance at the University of North Carolina
Law School, and Benjamin Weadon, Executive Editor, North Carolina Banking Institute
Journal, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
2. Section 603(a)(2) states that the FDIC "may not approve an application for deposit
insurance under section 5 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1815) that is
received after November 23, 2009, for an industrial bank, a credit card bank, or a trust bank
that is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a commercial firm." 12 U.S.C. § 1815
(Supp. IV 2010). See also infra notes 81-85.
3. See V. Gerard Comizio, Bank Chartering Issues in the New MillenniumComparing Depository Holding Companies and Bank Charters, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 153, 153-77 (2002); see also Mindy West, The FDIC'sSupervision of Industrial Loan
Companies: A Historical Perspective, I SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 5, 8 (2004) [hereinafter
FDIC Study] (noting that views expressed in SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the FDIC, and in particular, should not be
construed as definitive regulatory or supervisory guidance).
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business matter, in most respects, ILCs may engage in most of the same
activities as other depository institutions insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and thus may offer a full range of loans,
including consumer, commercial and residential real estate, small
business, and subprime.4 The regulation of the safety and soundness of
ILCs rests with the FDIC and the ILC's respective state charter
regulator. ILCs are also generally subject to the same federal safety and
soundness and consumer protection laws that apply to other FDICinsured institutions.
Notably, under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act),5
any company that controls a "bank," as defined, is subject to prudential
regulation as a bank or financial holding company by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), which has established
a consolidated supervisory framework for bank holding company
structures. 6 However, ILCs are not defined as "banks" for the purposes
of the BHC Act, and thus, companies that own or control ILCs operate
under an exception to the BHC Act, and most are not subject to FRB
oversight.7
The ILC industry has experienced significant asset growth in
recent years and has evolved from one-time, small, limited purpose
institutions to a diverse industry that includes some of the nation's
largest and more complex financial institutions.8 Over the last decade a
growing number of commercial entities have become increasingly
interested in owning ILCs. For example, a number of large commercial

4. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Advisory Committee on Banking Policy: IndustrialLoan
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/advisorycommittee/ilc060204.html
Companies (ILCs),
(last updated Feb. 26, 2009).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2006).
6. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).

7. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H); see also Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar,
That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Banking Holding Company

Regulation in the United States, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011). Moreover, to date
the FDIC does not have consolidated supervisory authority over ILC holding companies.
The FDIC has, however, employed what some term as a "bank-centric" supervisory
approach that primarily focuses on isolating the ILC from potential risks posed by holding
companies and affiliates, rather than assessing these potential risks systemically across the
consolidated holding company structure. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO05-621, GAO REP. TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, H.R., INDUSTRIAL LOAN
CORPORATIONS:

RECENT

ASSET

GROWTH

AND

COMMERCIAL

INTEREST

HIGHLIGHT

DIFFERENCES INREGULATORY AUTHORITY, 18 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247759.pdf.; see also discussion, infra Part II.E.

8. See 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 7.
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entities-primarily consumer retail companies-were granted approval
to open ILCs in 2004. Wal-Mart, one of the largest retail enterprises in
the United States, applied for an ILC charter at that time, triggering a
robust public debate, including Congressional scrutiny, about whether
ILCs ownership by commercial companies may expand beyond the
original scope and purpose intended by Congress. 9 In particular, the
question debated was whether or not the ILC exception to the BHC Act
0
constitutes a "loophole" in need of fixing.
In response to this public debate, the FDIC imposed a series of
moratoriums on the chartering or acquisition of ILCs by commercial
companies. 1 Subsequently, Dodd-Frank adopted the additional threeyear statutory moratorium, designed to provide time for further study of
2
the relative merits of this exception and whether it was problematic.
Interestingly, prior to Dodd-Frank, the status of ILCs had previously
been addressed in a number of government studies, at times in the
context of analysis of the overall regulation of the financial services
industry. Products of a variety of economic, political and regulatory
climates and circumstances over the years, these studies provide
fascinating insight into the development of public policy and regulatory
oversight of ILCs.
The article first analyzes the various government studies issued
over the years regarding the ILC charter and its ownership by
commercial firms, and also discusses the circumstances surrounding the
FDIC moratoriums on ownership or acquisition of ILCs by commercial
companies. Second, this article analyzes the relative merits of a wide
range of options for resolving the complex policy, regulatory and
competitive issues related to the ILC charter that will be presented upon
expiration of the current moratorium.

9. Id.; see also JAMES R. BARTH AND TONG Li (WITH APANARD ANGKINAND, YUANCHIANG AND Li L), MILKEN INSTITUTE, INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES: SUPPORTING
AMERICA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2011).

HsIN

10.

See id.; see also Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,

2007, at Cl(indicating that three commercial firms recently received regulatory approval to
form ILCs: retail stores Target (Target Bank) and Sears (Sears Bank) and automaker Toyota
(Toyota Financial Savings Bank)).
11.

See infra Part II.B.

12.

See infra Part III.B
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II. ISSUES ABOUT ILCs PRIOR To DODD FRANK
A. The Bush Task Force Report

During a recession in the early 1980s fueled by high interest
rates that were a primary cause of the then-emerging savings and loan
crisis, Vice President George H. W. Bush was appointed in 1982 by
President Reagan to chair the Task Group on Regulation of Financial
Services (the "Task Group"). The goal of the Task Group was to
reform the federal financial regulatory system, primarily through
developing "practical proposals to strengthen the effectiveness of
federal regulation, while also encouraging competition and reducing
unnecessary costs."'13 On July 2, 1984, the Task Group issued its report,
entitled "Blueprint for Reform" (the "Bush Report"). 14 The Bush
Report set forth wide-ranging recommendations for broad restructuring
and reform of the financial regulatory system, issuing a total of four
5
dozen major recommendations.1
On reform of the bank regulatory system, the report's
recommendations focused on (1) maintaining the dual banking system
of state and federal banks, (2) restructuring supervision at the federal
level so that there is only one federal regulator of state chartered banks,
(3) having the agency regulating the lead bank of any banking
organization also regulate its holding company, to eliminate "overlap
central bank,
and inefficiency," and (4) having the FRB, as the nation's
"maintain a meaningful role in the regulatory system." 16
Notably, within this framework, the Bush Report did not focus
at all on issues of, or the need to reform, ILCs in any manner. This
likely reflected the relatively small ILC industry in existence at that
time. 7 The ILC industry changed dramatically, however, over the next
30 years.

13. TASK GRP. ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERV., BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE
REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 2 (1984).

14.

Id.

15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. at 11-12.
17. ILC assets totaled only $3.8 billion in 1987. 2005 GAO

REPORT,

supra note 7.
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B. The FDICILC Moratorium
Between 1987 and 2004, ILC assets grew over 3,500 percent
from $3.8 billion to over $140 billion.1 8 This dramatic increase can be
attributed to the formation and acquisition of ILCs by both financial and
commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) companies. In 2005, soon after Sears,
Home Depot and Target had received ILC charters, Wal-Mart attempted
to charter a Utah ILC-after first failing to acquire a California ILCand sought federal deposit insurance from the FDIC. 19 Many in the
banking industry, Congress and some community groups objected to the
Wal-Mart application citing, in part, the longstanding principle of
separation of commerce and banking.2 0 In response to the emerging
controversy and public debate over the Wal-Mart application, on
August 1, 2006, the FDIC imposed a six-month moratorium on agency
action with respect to applications for deposit insurance for any ILC,
citing concerns regarding the lack of federal consolidated supervision,
potential risks from mixing banking and commerce, and the potential
for an "unlevel playing field" in the banking industry. 2 1 The asserted
purposes of the moratorium were to allow the FDIC to further evaluate
industry developments, to determine whether ILCs present safety and
soundness concerns or risks to the insurance funds, to evaluate the need
for statutory, regulatory, or policy changes, and-at a more subtle
level-give Congress an opportunity to react to the controversy if it so

18.

Id.

19. Prior to its 2005 attempt to charter a Utah ILC, Walmart had made several failed
attempts to enter the banking business, including attempting to charter a Californian ILC in
2002, and in 2001 initiating a program to operate in-store bank branches through a
partnership with TD Bank USA, a subsidiary of Canada's Toronto Dominion Bank. See
Steven Oberbeck, Wal-Mart Applies to Launch a Bank in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 19,
2005, 1:16 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=2869740&itype=NGPSID; see also

Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,531, 10,532 (Mar. 1,
2006); Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., A Wal-Mart-Owned Bank Would Set Bad Precedent, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 16, 2002, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/167_159/179826-1.html; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Community Groups Protest Wal-Mart ILC Application, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 24, 2006, available at https://www.americanbanker.com/issues/171_58/273649-1.html (listing the groups opposing Wal-Mart's ILC application).
21. See Moratorium on Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71
Fed. Reg. 43,482, 43,482; see also Joe Adler, Reading Tea Leaves ofILC Moratorium,AM.
BANKER Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/171_150/285348-1.html.
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chose.22
The terms of the moratorium provided that the FDIC could not
take any action to accept, approve, or deny any application for deposit
insurance submitted to the FDIC by, or on behalf of, any proposed or
existing ILC, or accept, disapprove, or issue a letter of intent not to
disapprove any change control application or notice submitted to the
FDIC with respect to any ILC.23 As such, the FDIC not only refused to
act on pending applications to acquire an ILC or obtain deposit
insurance for a newly formed ILC, but also refused to accept any new
applications.2 4 The moratorium was to be in effect until January 31,
2007.
On January 31, 2007, the FDIC announced a one-year, partial
extension of the moratorium.2 5 One of the reasons cited for the
extension was pressure from Congress. 26 Specifically, on December 7,
2006, 107 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to the
Chairman of the FDIC urging the agency to extend the moratorium for
at least six months to "allow the 110th Congress an opportunity to act
27
on this important public policy issue.'
The scope of the extended moratorium was narrowed, so that it
applied only to applications for deposit insurance and change in control
notices with respect to ILCs that will become subsidiaries of companies
engaged in non-financial activities, 28 i.e., commercial activities not
22.
23.

71 Fed. Reg. at 43,483.
Id.

24. In fact, the moratorium specifically stated that, while the moratorium is in effect,
"the FDIC will not 'accept' applications for deposit insurance for any ILC or notices of
change in control with respect to any ILC, regardless of whether the application or notice is
substantially complete." Id.
25. See Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg.
5290, 5290 (Feb. 5, 2007). It remains an open - and intriguing - question as to whether the
filing of a writ of mandamus against the FDIC regarding pending ILC applications would
have caused a judicial confrontation over the legality of an extended moratorium period.
26. Id. at 5293.
27.

See

Letter

from

Barney

Frank,

Congressman

(Mass.),

U.S.

House

of

Representatives & Paul Gillmor, Congressman (Ohio), U.S. House of Representatives, to
Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 7, 2006).
28. For purposes of the extended moratorium, the term "financial activity" includes: (i)
banking, managing or controlling banks or savings associations; and (ii) any activity
permissible for financial holding companies under 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), any specific activity
that is listed as permissible for bank holding companies under 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c), as well
as activities that the FRB has permitted for bank holding companies under 12 CFR §§
225.28 and 225.86, and any activity permissible for all savings and loan holding companies
under 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c). The term "non-financial activity" is any other activity. The
FDIC intends to follow the written guidance of the FRB and the Office of Thrift Supervision
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permissible for financial holding companies. 29 Companies 30engaged in
financial activities could continue to charter or acquire ILCs.
C. The FDIC's Views on Supervision of ILCs
At the outset of the ILC debate and FDIC moratoriums, the
FDIC issued a supervisory publication in 2005 entitled The FDIC's
Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical Perspective
(the FDIC Study).3 ' The FDIC's Study discussed "historical and
current perspectives of ILC supervision" and the chronology of ILC
failures.3 2
The FDIC Study recognized that some observers questioned
whether current arrangements for overseeing the relationship between
an ILC and its parent would provide sufficient regulatory safeguards if
more extensive mixing of banking and commerce were permitted.3 3 In
apparent support of "bank-centric" regulation, the FDIC Study noted
that "strategies to monitor and control a bank's relationship with
affiliated and controlling entities are fundamental to effective bank
supervision under any organizational form that banks adopt," and that
"[t]his principle is enshrined in U.S. banking legislation, bank
regulation, and supervisory practice." 34 In terms of regulation, the
(OTS) regarding permissible holding company activities in its interpretations of the term
"financial activity" and to consult with the FRB and/or OTS before making any decisions.
It should be noted that section 313 of Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished the OTS and
transferred the powers and duties regarding regulation of savings and loan holding
companies to the FRB.
29. 72 Fed. Reg. at 5293.
30. Id.
31. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 5.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The FDIC Study was issued prior to the final crisis and the criticisms aimed by
Congress and others at the now defunct OTS over its approach to holding company
regulation of AIG, the parent company of AIG Bank, FSB. The OTS was alleged to have
adopted in the late 1990s a so-called holding company "lite" policy focusing primarily on
regulation of bank subsidiaries and their affiliate relationships. In any future debate over
FDIC regulation of ILCs, this perceived similarity between holding company "lite" and
"bank-centric" regulatory policies are likely to be raised, and, at minimum, may weigh in
favor of providing the FDIC and, at minimum, may weigh in favor of providing the FDIC
with consolidated regulatory authority. See Chana Joffe-Walt, Regulating AIG: Who Fell
Asleep
on
the
Job?,
NPR
(June
5,
2009,
11:10
AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104979546 (noting OTS "taking
blame" for failing to adequately regulate AIG as a savings and loan holding company at
March 5, 2009 Senate hearings on collapse of AIG credit default savings portfolio); see also
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FDIC Study stressed that stand-alone banks, savings associations, bank
and thrift holding company subsidiaries, ILCs, and other FDIC-insured
entities are subject to, among other regulations, Sections 23A and 23B
of the Federal Reserve Act, which limits bank transactions with
affiliates, including the parent company, 35 and FRB Regulation 0,
which places limitations on loans to bank insiders and applies to all
insured banks. 36 Further, the FDIC Study noted that prompt corrective
action regulations required under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as
amended (FDI Act) 37 mandate progressively severe sanctions against
any insured bank whose owners fail to maintain adequate capitalization
in that bank.38 The FDIC Study also stated that "[t]his array of
safeguards reflects the importance Congress and the banking agencies
attach to containing the potential cost of bank failures. 39
The FDIC Study also contained a complete chronology of all
ILC failures, and concluded that these bank failures were caused by
various factors, including weak economic conditions, failed business
strategies, insufficient oversight by boards of directors, fraud
perpetrated by bank insiders, and the nature of the influence exerted by
a holding company or other controlling entity.40 Further, it concluded
that the problems that can cause a bank to fail "strike democratically
across charter types and regulatory structures. '4 1 More specifically, the
FDIC Study concluded that ILC failures reinforce the observation that
appropriate safeguards over inter-affiliate transactions are important
42
under any charter type.
The FDIC Study further observed that depending on the
organizational form a banking company adopts, "federal oversight of

discussion, infra notes 66-68, 101, 104, 105, 114.
35. Id. Sections 23A and 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c-371c-1, by their terms, apply only to
state member banks and national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1468 makes sections 23A and 23B
applicable to savings associations. Section 180) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18280),
however, makes sections 23A and 23B applicable to state nonmember banks, including
ILCs.
36. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 5; Regulation 0, 12 C.F.R. § 215 (2011) (loans to
insiders); see also 12 C.F.R. § 337.3 (making Regulation 0 prohibitions and limitations on
loans to insiders applicable to all insured nonmember banks).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 etseq.
38. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 325 (focusing on nonmember banks).
39. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 5.
40. Id. at 11-13.
41. Id. at5 5-6.
42. Id. at 6.
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the relationship between an insured bank and its affiliates may occur in
two ways: bank supervision and holding company supervision, '' 3 and
that "[b]ank supervision does not involve extensive federal banking
agency oversight of controlling entities and their related interests. ' '4
For example, the FDIC Study noted that if the controlling shareholder
of a community bank also owns an automobile dealership, that
dealership is not supervised by a federal banking agency. 45 As such, the
statutory, regulatory, and supervisory safeguards cited in the FDIC
Study "are designed to prevent abuse of the bank by the owner, and the
owner may be required to produce documents and financial records that
detail the bank's relationship with the dealership. 4 6
As to holding company supervision, the FDIC Study noted the
functional regulation aspects of the FRB's consolidated supervision of
bank and financial holding companies.4 7 In this regard, the FRB clearly
has had comprehensive and longstanding statutory authority, and
experience in the regulation, examination and supervision of bank
holding companies and their affiliates on a consolidated basis.4 8
43. Id.
44. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. An ILC can be owned by a bank holding company, in which case the parent
company is subject to FRB supervision. In addition to supervising bank holding companies,
the FRB, under the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, Title 1, 113
Stat. 1338, (GLBA) and Dodd-Frank, has consolidated supervisory powers with respect to
financial holding companies. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 § 604, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing the FRB with
broad consolidated authority over bank holding companies and their subsidiaries).
48. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2006) (permissible activities for bank holding
companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), (k)(4)(F) (2006) (qualification and approval standards
for electing status as a financial holding company); 12 C.F.R. § 238.63 (2012) (defining the
requirements for savings and loan holding companies to engage in financial holding
company activities); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006) (permissible activities for financial holding
companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (2006) (permissible investments by bank holding
companies in up to five percent of the voting interests of any company engaged in any
activity); 12 U.S.C. § 371c and 371c-l (2006) (limitations on transactions between banks
and their holding company affiliates); 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2006) (anti-tying restrictions); 12
U.S.C. § 1852 (2006) (liability concentration limits in mergers by financial companies); 12
U.S.C. § 601, 611 (2006) (regulation of foreign activities of US bank holding companies);
Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (international banking operations of US bank holding
companies); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, 225 (bank holding company regulatory capital
requirements); 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010) (so-called Volcker rule restrictions on the
ability of a banking entity to engage in certain proprietary trading and covered fund
activities); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 §
165(i)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1430-31 (2010); see also Enhanced
Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed.
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In contrast, the FDIC Study observed that the FDIC in essence

had neither the specific statutory authority, nor early on the experience
to regulate, examine or supervise bank parent companies, noting that the
early FDIC and state examinations of those ILCs with commercial
parents that had obtained federal deposit insurance proved
"challenging.,

49

Examiners encountered management unaccustomed to

regulatory oversight and sometimes unwilling to provide information.5 °
"These entities operated as an extension of the parent, not as
autonomous, federally insured and regulated banks. It became apparent
that such ILCs needed to be introduced to and helped to understand the
specifics of banking regulation and corporate governance of the separate
ILC entity."51 The FDIC Study concluded that ILC senior management
must be held accountable for ensuring that all bank operations and
business functions are performed in compliance with banking

Reg. 594 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (annual stress testing
requirements for bank holding companies with $10 billion or greater in assets); Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 165, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1430-31 (2010); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 § 166, 12 U.S.C. § 5366 (Supp. IV 2010); 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2012) (enhanced
supervision and prudential standards for nonbank holding companies supervised by the FRB
and certain bank holding companies as well as early remediation and "living will"
requirements); 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006) (general enforcement authority over bank, savings
and loan and financial holding companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1831o1 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 238.8
(administer and enforce requirements that bank holding companies serve as a "source of
financial and managerial strength" to their subsidiary depository institutions); 12 C.F.R. pt.
238 (2012); FED. RESERVE BD., SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY LETTER 09-4, APPLYING
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE AND REGULATIONS ON THE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS, STOCK
REDEMPTIONS, AND STOCK REPURCHASES AT BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (2009) (regulation

of dividends, capital distributions and stock redemption by BHCs); 12 U.S.C. § 1831i
(2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 238 (2012) (required notice by "troubled" BHCs, as defined, to
provide 30 days notice to the FRB prior to adding or replacing any member of its board of
directors, employing any person as a senior executive officer, or changing the
responsibilities of any senior executive officer so that the person would assume a different
senior executive officer position); 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3208 (2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 238 (2006)
(prohibitions on certain depository institution holding company management interlocks, and
available exceptions and exemptions); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 359
(restrictions on golden parachute and indemnification payments to troubled BHCs and their
subsidiaries and affiliates); V. Gerard Comizio & Helen Y. Lee, Brave New World for
Savings and Loan Holding Companies: Final Phase-In of the Federal Reserve Board's
Bank Holding Company Reporting Requirements and ConsolidatedSupervisory Framework
for Holding Company Regulation, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLICY REP. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript on file with authors).
49. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 9.
50. Id. For example, examiners frequently could not identify local officers with
decision-making authority or find records, including loan documentation, on site.
51. Id.
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regulations and in a safe and sound manner.5 2
The FDIC Study also noted that "[t]he FDIC has developed
conditions that may be imposed when approving deposit insurance
applications for institutions that will be owned by or significantly
53
involved in transactions with commercial or financial companies.
52. To guarantee sufficient autonomy and insulate the bank from the parent, the state
authority, the FDIC, or both typically impose certain controls. The FDIC Study cited one
example of"proactive state supervision:"
[T]he Utah Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI"), which imposes
conditions for approval of new industrial bank charters, giv[es]
considerable weight to the following factors:
" The organizers have solid character, reputation, and
financial standing.
" The organizers have the resources (source of capital) to support an
ILC.
" The selection of a board of directors, the majority of whom must be
outside, unaffiliated individuals, and some of whom must be Utah
residents.
" The establishment of a Utah organization where autonomous
decision-making authority and responsibilities reside with the board
and management such that they are in control of the ILC's activities
and direction.
" Management that has a track record and the knowledge, expertise,
and experience in operating a depository institution in a regulated
environment.
" Management that is independent of the parent; however, the goals and
policies of the parent may be carried out if defined in the ILC's
business plan.
* A bona fide business plan and purpose for the existence of an ILC, in
which deposit-taking is an integral component, including three years'
pro forma projections and supporting detail.
• FDIC deposit insurance.
" All ILC lending and activities must comply with Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act (restrictions on transactions with
affiliates) and Federal Reserve Regulation 0 (loans to executive
officers, directors, or principal shareholders).
See FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 9-10 (citing UTAH DEP'T OF FIN. INST.,
www.dfi.utah.gov/Finlnst.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
53. A sampling of the "nonstandard conditions" that the FDIC may require include:
@The organizers will appoint a board of directors, the majority of whom will be
independent of the bank's parent company and its affiliated entities.
* The bank will appoint and retain knowledgeable, experienced, and independent
executive officers.
e The bank will develop and maintain a current written business plan, adopted by
the bank's board of directors that is appropriate to the nature and complexity of
the activities conducted by the bank and separate from the business plan of the
affiliated companies.
* To the extent management, staff, or other personnel or resources are employed
by both the bank and the bank's parent company or any affiliated entities, the
bank's board of directors will ensure that such arrangements are governed by
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The FDIC Study also noted that

[a]s with any bank-level review of an institution with
affiliates, examination procedures include an assessment
of the bank's corporate structure and how the bank
interacts with the affiliates (including a review of
intercompany transactions and interdependencies) as
well as an evaluation of any financial risks that may be
inherent in the relationship. Examiners review the
current written business plan and evaluate any
changes.54
In examining any insured depository institution, the
FDIC Study also stressed that the FDIC has the
authority under Section 10(b) of the FDI Act to examine

any affiliate of the institution, including the parent
company, for purposes of determining (i) the
relationship between the ILC and its parent and (ii) the
effect of such a relationship on the ILC.

Further,

Section 10(c) of the FDI Act empowers the FDIC, in the
course of its supervisory activities, to issue subpoenas
and to take and preserve testimony under oath, so long
as the documentation or information sought relates to

the affairs or ownership of the insured institution.55

written contracts giving the bank authority and control necessary to direct and
administer the bank's affairs.
See FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Regional Director
Memorandum (RDM) 2004-11, Imposition of Prudential Conditions in Approvals of
Applicationsfor Deposit Insurance,dated Mar. 12, 2004)).
54. The FDIC Study noted that FDIC examiners review, among other things: any
arrangements involving shared management or employees. In the latter case, referred to as
"dual employees," agreements should be in place that define compensation arrangements,
specify how to avoid conflicts of interest, establish reporting lines, and assign authority for
managing the dual-employee relationship. All services provided to or purchased from an
affiliate must be on the same terms and conditions as would be applied to nonaffiliated
entities. All service relationships must be governed by a written agreement, and the bank
should have a contingency plan for all critical business functions performed by affiliated
companies. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 10.
55. The FDIC Study noted that "[a]ccordingly, individuals, corporations, partnerships,
or other entities that in any way affect the institution's affairs or ownership may be
subpoenaed and required to produce documents." FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 10-11; See
12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (Supp. V 2011); 12 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (2006).
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In addition, the FDIC Study noted that the three states with the
most ILCs under regulation-Utah, California, and Nevada-also "have
direct authority to conduct examinations of parents and affiliates. 56
D. CRS Reportfor Congress on ILCs
In mid-2005, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
released a report on ILCs (the CRS Report).57 The CRS Report, in

providing context for the ILC "controversy," provided a historical
overview of the separation of banking and commerce, examined the
"nature" of ILCs and their regulation, and analyzed relevant legislation
58

in Congress.

In so doing, the CRS Report concluded that ILCs evoke two

major policy questions: first, should Congress grant ILCs powers that
"would allow them to be nationwide banks while in competition with
community banks?" and second, could the combination of state and
FDIC regulation provide oversight "comparable to that for nationwide
59
banks, especially to bank holding companies?
Among other things, the CRS Report noted that "[t]he ILC form
reflects a persistent tendency to combine the financing of a business
56. FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 11. The Utah DFI "requires all parent companies to
register with the state under Section 7-8-16 of the Utah Code and has authority to examine
such companies under Section 7-1-510." Id. at n. 15. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-8-16, 7-1510 (2006). The California Department of Financial Institutions has authority to examine
parent organizations and to require reports and information through Section 3703. See CAL.
FIN. CODE. §§ 21-3703-4 (West 2012). "In the state of Nevada, holding companies are
required to register with the Secretary of State," and the Nevada Financial Institutions
Department has the authority to conduct examinations of parent organizations. See NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 658.185 (2009).
57. See William D. Jackson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32767, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
COMPANIES/BANKS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE: LEGISLATIVE AND

REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES(2005) (hereinafter CRS Report).
58. Id. at 2-11.
59. Id. at 1.
The 108th Congress considered these issues in two bills that passed the House. H.R. 758
would have allowed ILCs to provide and pay interest on business checking accounts, while
H.R. 1375 would have allowed ILCs to open branches even without permission from the
states of the new branches. Taken together, such measures could have transformed ILCs
into a parallel banking system regulated primarily by a few states, yet allowing ILCs to
grow into large institutions with commercial ownership. In 2005, Wal-Mart announced that
it is again applying for an ILC charter, thus affecting any banking "regulatory relief'
legislation in the 109th Congress. [Following this announcement,] H.R. 1224, allowing
business checking accounts in a way to prevent ILCs owned by nonfinancial businesses
from becoming more bank-like via new accounts, passed the House on May 24, 2005, [but
died in the Senate]. Id.
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with its operations, . .. standard in many countries, especially Germany
60
and Japan, but [which has] generally fallen into disfavor in America."
The CRS Report concluded, therefore, that ILCs "have developed
against a long U.S. tradition of the separation of banking and
commerce." 6 1 The CRS Report also presented a number of arguments
for and against ILCs.6 2
E. The 2005 GAO Report
Also in the context of the 2005 ILC debate, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of then Congressman
James Leach, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
conducted a study of ILC regulation, and proposed recommendations
"To better ensure that
regarding the ILC regulatory scheme. 63
supervisors of institutions with similar risks have similar authorities,"
the 2005 GAO Report concluded that Congress should consider various
options for regulating ILCs such as (1) eliminating the current exclusion
for ILCs and their holding companies "from consolidated supervision"
by the FRB, (2) granting the FDIC "similar examination and
enforcement authority as a consolidated supervisor," or (3) "leaving the
oversight responsibility of small, less complex ILCs with the FDIC, and
transferring oversight of large, more complex ILCs to a consolidated
64
supervisor.
In addition, the 2005 GAO Report recommended that Congress
more broadly consider the advantages and disadvantages
of mixing banking and commerce to determine whether
continuing to allow ILC holding companies to engage in
this activity significantly more than the holding
companies of other types of financial institutions is
warranted or whether other entities should be permitted

60. Id.
61. The CRS Report stated that "ownership interests that nonfinancial firms may have
in banks are generally 25% or less. Banks may generally hold only nominal amounts of
corporate stock." Id.
62. CRS Report, supra note 57, at 10-11. See infra text accompanying notes 98-106.
63. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
64. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
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65
to engage in this level of activity.

In written comments to the 2005 GAO Report, the FRB
concurred with the report's findings and conclusions insofar as it
accorded with the FRB's views that "[c]onsolidated supervision
provides important protections to the insured banks that are part of a
larger organization, as well as the federal safety net that supports those
banks" and that the report "[p]roperly highlights the broad policy
implications that ILCs raise with respect to maintaining the separation
of banking and commerce. 6 6
In written comments from the FDIC, the FDIC concurred with
the 2005 GAO Report insofar as it concluded that-ILCs
do not appear to have a greater risk of failure than other
types of insured depository institutions but generally
believed that no changes were needed in its supervisory
approach over ILCs and their holding companies, and
disagreed with the matters for congressional
consideration.67
Specifically,
[the]
FDIC's
disagreements focused on three primary areas-whether
consolidated supervision of ILC holding companies is
necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of the ILC;
that FDIC's supervisory authority may not be sufficient
to effectively supervise ILCs and insulate insured
institutions against undue risks presented by external
parties; and the impact that consolidated supervision of
ILCs and their holding companies would have on the
marketplace and the federal safety net.68
The FDIC conceded, however, "that consolidated supervision
offers broader examination and enforcement authorities that may be
65.

Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Richard Hillman,

Director, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, at 1 (Aug. 19, 2005). See 2005 GAO REPORT,

supra note 7, at 90.
66.

2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 9, 82, 90. See also Letter from Donald E.

Powell, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., to Richard HiUman, Director, U.S.
Gov't Accountability

Office

(Aug.

29, 2005)

(on

file with author), available

http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2005/chairman/spsept2205a.pdf
67.
68.

2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10.
Id.

at
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used to understand, monitor, and when appropriate, restrain the risks
associated with insured depository institutions in a holding company
structure"-in essence, a "we don't need it, but we'd be glad to have it"
approach.69
F. The U.S. Departmentof The Treasury Blueprintfor a Modernized
FinancialRegulatory Structure
Following a conference on capital markets competitiveness in
March 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury conducted a study on
the regulatory structure of the financial system, which was released in
March 2008 as a new "blueprint" for a modernized financial regulatory
structure (the Treasury Blueprint).70 The Treasury Blueprint provided
"short-term" and "intermediate-term" recommendations for "improving
The "short term"
and reforming" the U.S. regulatory structure.
recommendations focused on improving "regulatory coordination and
oversight" in the wake of the then-emerging financial crisis, and the
"intermediate-term" recommendations focused on "eliminating some of
the duplication of the U.S. regulatory system but more importantly
trying to modernize the regulatory structure applicable to certain
sections in the financial services" system, namely banking, insurance,
securities, and futures. 7 '
Interestingly enough, notwithstanding the intensity of the
legislative, banking agency, and banking industry debate prior to the
financial crisis on the issue of the future availability of the ILC charter
to commercial companies, ILCs received a light-and somewhat
favorable-touch in the Treasury Blueprint. In a wide-ranging section
of the report entitled "Chartering and Regulation of Depository
Institutions," the Treasury Blueprint identified that the key issue of
"[a]llowing a [federally insured depository institution (FIDI)] to affiliate
with a commercial firm raise[d] the longstanding debate in the [U.S.]
about allowing for a broader mix of banking and commerce."7 2 The
Treasury Blueprint noted that "[p]roponents of allowing FIDIs to
affiliate with commercial firms generally point to several reasons: the
69. Id. at 10, 84.
70.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY

STRUCTURE (2008) (hereinafter Treasury Blueprint).
71. Id. at 1-3.
72. Id. at 164.
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potential for increased competition and innovation, safety and
soundness benefits of diversification, adequate protection of a FIDI
through separation and firewalls, and antitrust protections against
improper exercise of economic power., 73 Similarly, the Treasury
Blueprint noted that "[o]pponents raise several other concerns:
increased safety and soundness risks (related to the [perceived]
ineffectiveness of firewalls), undue concentration of economic power,
conflicts of interest in credit allocation, misallocation of resources in the
economy, and inappropriate extension of the federal safety net."74
Significantly, the Treasury Blueprint stressed that "[i]n
evaluating the issue of commercial affiliations with FIDIs, it is
important to note that the [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) ha[d]
already permitted broader affiliations between insured depository
institutions and other financialfirms though a financial services holding
company framework," and, as such, "[c]oncerns regarding the transfer
of the 'safety net' should not differ for financial or commercial firms. '75
The Treasury Blueprint noted that "[o]ne key difference is that, in
general, financial affiliates are subject to some degree of financial
regulation while commercial firms are not.",76 The Treasury Blueprint
observed
[t]hat might provide some comfort in terms of risks an
affiliate may pose to a FIDI, but the history of
commercial firms affiliating with insured depository
institutions has not supported the view of greater risks
present in such structures. The enhanced individual

bank oversight authority provided to [a bank's primary
federal regulatory agency (PFRA)-"bank-centric"
regulation-]is designed to address the range of
concerns existing across all types of affiliations with
FIDIs.7

The Treasury Blueprint also noted that "[h]olding company

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. (emphasis added)
76. Treasury Blueprint, supra note 70, at 164.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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regulation was designed to protect the assets of the insured depository
institution and to prevent the affiliate structure from threatening the
assets of the insured institution. However, some market participants
view holding company supervision as intended to protect non-bank
entities within a holding company structure. 78 In the "optimal
structure," the Treasury Blueprint concluded that "PFRA will focus on
the original intent of holding company supervision, protecting the assets
of the insured depository institution; and a new market stability
regulator will focus on broader systemic risk issues., 79 The Treasury
Blueprint asserted the Treasury's "belief that a combination of enhanced
oversight of affiliate relationships by the prudential regulator and a
market stability regulator with the appropriate expertise and authority to
harness market forces provides the most effective and efficient method
' 80
of supervision."
In summary, the Treasury Blueprint clearly provided a blueprint
for the continued and perhaps expanding ownership of FIDIs by
commercial firms through prudential, "bank-centric" oversight of
affiliate relationships by the FIDI's PFRA.
III. ILCS AFTER DODD-FRANK
A. The Dodd-FrankMoratoriums

Section 603 of Dodd-Frank establishes a three-year moratorium,
with a sunset date of July 21, 2013, prohibiting the FDIC from
approving any application for deposit insurance received after
November 23, 2009 for an industrial loan bank or certain other
depository institutions (credit card banks and trust banks) (collectively
"industrial banks") exempt from the definition of "bank" under Section
2 of the BHC Act, if they would be directly or indirectly owned or
controlled by a commercial firm. 8' Since these institutions are not
treated as "banks" under the BHC Act, they may be owned by a
company that is engaged in nonfinancial activities, and thus, do not
78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80. Id. at 164-65.
81. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (Supp. V 2011). The list of institutions exempt from the
definition of "bank" is available at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (2006). See infra text
accompanying note 111.
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qualify as a bank holding company under the BHC Act.
For purposes of this moratorium, a company is a "commercial

firm" if the annual gross revenues derived by the company and all its
affiliates from activities that are not "financial in nature," as defined
under Section 4(k) of the BHC Act as permissible activities for financial
holding companies regulated by the FRB, represents more than 15
82
percent of the consolidated annual gross revenues of that company.
Consolidated revenues include the ownership or control of one or more
depository institutions.

83

an
Subject to certain exceptions, the FDIC may not approve
84
firm.
commercial
a
by
ILC
an
of
control
in
acquisition or change
B. Dodd-FrankAct GAO Study of ILC Exemptions Under the BHC Act
Section 603 also required that the Comptroller General of the

GAO to "carry out a study to determine whether it is necessary, in order
to strengthen the safety and soundness of the institutions and the

stability of the financial system, to eliminate" the industrial loan bank
exception under section 2 of the BHC Act. 85 The study was required to
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (Supp. V 2011). A list of activities that are classified as
"financial in nature is available at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 538 1(b) (Supp. V 2011).
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (Supp. V 2011). There are certain limited exceptions to this
moratorium for a change in
control:
" involving an industrial bank "in danger of default," as determined by
the appropriate federal banking agency ("AFBA"); that "results from
the merger or 'whole' acquisition of a commercial firm that directly
or indirectly controls the industrial bank," in a "bona fide" merger
with another commercial firm, as determined by the AFBA; or
* that "results from the acquisition of voting shares of a publicly traded
company," if, after the acquisition, (a) the company shareholder (or group of
shareholders acting in concert) hold less than 25 percent of any class of voting
stock of the company, and (b) has obtained all regulatory approvals required for
such change in control under applicable federal or state law. Id.
85. Id. The study's content "to the extent feasible" must "be based on information
provided to the Comptroller General by the appropriate federal or state regulator," and must
address the following:
" "identify the types and number of institutions currently [exempted) from
Section 2 of the [BHC Act];"
" generally describe the size and geographic locations of the institutions;
" "determine the extent to which the institutions.., are held by holding
companies that are commercial firms;
" determine whether the institutions described.., have any affiliates that are
commercial firms;
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be submitted to Congress no later than eighteen months from the date of
enactment of Dodd-Frank.86
On January 19, 2012, the GAO published its study (the 2012
GAO Study).87 The study found that exempt banks include industrial
loan corporations, limited-purpose credit card banks, trust institutions
with insured deposits and thrifts and that removal of these exemptions
would likely cause these parent companies to be regulated as bank
holding companies under the BHC Act.8 8 Due to the non-banking
nature of their businesses, some of these parent companies would be
unable to meet the requirements of the BHC Act, primarily the
requirements to be engaged only in financially related activities.8 9
Further, the study found that because exempt banks make up a
small percentage of the overall banking system, and vary by size,
activities and risk profile, removing these exemptions would likely have
little impact on the U.S. credit markets because of the small percentage
of assets held by these exempt banks. 90
As to the views of the federal bank regulatory agencies, the
FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which
are responsible in part for regulating these exempt banks (but not their
parent holding companies) believe the exemptions need not be removed
because the current oversight regime for these institutions "is
sufficiently robust." 9 1 The FRB believes the exemptions should be
* identify the Federal banking agency responsible for the supervision of the
institutions ... on and after the transfer date;

" determine the adequacy of the Federal bank regulatory framework applicable to
each category of institution... including any restrictions (including limitations
on affiliate transactions or cross-marketing) that apply to transactions between
an institution, the holding company of the institution, and any other affiliate of
the institution; and
" evaluate the potential consequences of subjecting the institutions.., to the
requirements of the [BHC Act,] including with respect to the availability and
allocation of credit, the stability of the financial system and the economy, the
safe and sound operation of each category of institution, and the impact on the
types of activities in which such institutions, and the holding companies of such

institutions, may engage." Id.
86.
87.

Id.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY

REGULATIONS

OF EXEMPT

INSTITUTIONS

OFFICE,
AND

GAO-12-160,

EXEMPTIONS (2012) (hereinafter 2012 GAO Study).

88. Id. at 1, 53.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Id. at 36-41.
91.

Id. at 1,30.

CHARACTERISTICS

THE IMPLICATIONS

OF REMOVING

AND
THE
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removed and that the holding companies of all FIDIs should be subject
to full BHC Act regulation. 92 The FRB also raised concerns that if the
exemptions remain intact, companies owning exempted banks may
grow large enough in the future to pose significant risks to the U.S.
93
financial system.
Interestingly enough, less than four years after the Treasury
Blueprint was issued-in which the Treasury essentially took the
position that enhanced oversight of ILC affiliate relationships by the
primary regulator would provide the "most effective and efficient
method of supervision, ' 9 the U.S. Treasury now apparently expressed
95
its opinion that the exemptions should be removed.
C. After the Dodd-FrankMoratorium: What's Next?
The Dodd-Frank moratorium on ILCs being owned or chartered
by nonfinancial companies expires on July 21, 2013.96 The important
question is what will happen once the moratorium expires. The most
likely probabilities are a legislative extension of the moratorium, or the
terms and conditions, if any, under which Congress would let the
moratorium lapse. Either scenario may result in a potential repeat of the
2005 debate about the ILC charter. The real question, though, is
whether it is possible for a different and more productive debate to
occur on the relative merits of the ILC charter that could benefit the
financial services industry as a whole-and its competitive realitiesand also satisfy potential regulatory concerns.9 7
The CRS Report aptly observed the following about the ILC
debate:
Debate over measures granting ILCs banking powers,
without requiring that their owners be bank holding
companies, involves interrelated questions.
They

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 1, 30.
See infra text accompanying note 85.
2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 57.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (Supp.V 2011).

97. Notably, any debate in the near future will likely be impacted by the current
regulatory climate in the wake of the global financial crisis and resulting financial reform
legislation.
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involve competitive equality, the nature and
effectiveness of regulation, and safety and soundness
issues. Comparisons of ILCs and banks involve value
judgments as to the safety and competitiveness of
banking institutions, federalism, and relations between
98
ownership and behavior.
In this light, the following is hopefully a fair summary of the
arguments for and against ILC expansion.
The FDIC, OCC, and state regulators have argued that ILCs and
other BHC Act-exempt FDIC insured banks are subject to their
respective bank-centric regulation: examinations, compliance with
banking laws, and supervisory restrictions, and have been successfully
regulated as a general matter. 99 In this view, no safety and soundness
reasons exist requiring constraints on this charter type beyond those
imposed on other FDIC-insured institutions.
Further, the nation's state banking regulators, through their
organization, "the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and the
Financial Services Roundtable believe in the potential for competitive
flexibility of ILCs, with their state charters forming just another part of
the 'dual banking system' of federal and state banking charters."' 00
Whether that support for the ILC charter extends to ownership by
nonfinancial companies, though, is less clear.
It also has been argued that ILCs have not experienced the
extent of problems that the rest of the banking industry has over the
years, and ILC parent companies have generally served successfully as
significant sources of strength to the operations and capital of their ILC
98. CRS Report, supra note 57, at 10.
99. See, e.g., 2012 GAO Report, supra note 87, at 25 (noting FDIC and OCC views);
2005 GAO Report, supra note 7, at 56-57.
100. CRS Report, supra note 57, at 10. See also Kathleen Day, "Firms" Push to Enter
Banking Wins Hill Support. WASH. POST, May 23, 2003, at E01; Joe Adler, Community

Groups Protest Wal-Mart ILC Application, AM. BANKER, Mar. 24, 2006, available at
https://www.americanbanker.com/issues/171_58/-273649-I.html; Joe Adler, Did Wal-Mart
Critics Make Their Case at Hearings? Answers on Legality, Payments System, Insurance,

More,

AM.

BANKER,

Apr.

18,

2006,

available

at

Joe Adler, FDIC Seen
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/171_75/-275330-i.html;
Having Little Leeway in ILC Controversy, AM. BANKER, Feb. 7, 2007, available at

http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_27/-302823-1 .html; Symposium, The Future of
Banking: The Structure and Role of Commercial Affiliations, FDIC, (2003), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/future-transcript.html.
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subsidiaries. As such, the argument is essentially that "if it ain't broke,
don't fix it."
Finally, the Treasury Blueprint presented the case for bankcentric regulation of ILCs - allowing ILC ownership by nonfinancial
companies as long as prudential "firewalls" on affiliate relationships are
in place.
Despite the fact that a "who's who" of domestic and
international corporations, retail stores, and auto companies have
obtained ILC and other "non-bank" charters in the last twenty years
without incident, Wal-Mart's application for an ILC charter in 2005
seemed to have been the straw that broke the camel's back for the
0
banking industry and its regulators.' '
In Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the Shadows,
Michelle Clark Neely notes the following concerns of regulators with
regard to ILC charters:
Most of the criticism leveled at the ILC industry centers
on commercial ownership and can be boiled down to its
10 2
effects on competition and safety and soundness.
First, letting nonfinancial firms own ILCs runs counter
to a long-standing-though somewhat porous-barrier
in the United States between banking and commerce.
Second, letting large commercial companies into
banking will create economic conglomerates and could
concentrate economic resources into the hands of a few.
Third, some ILCs, unlike most other regulated financial
institutions, are not subject to consolidated supervision
at the federal level, creating safety and soundness, as
03
well as competitive, issues.'
101. See Examining the Regulation and Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1
(2007) (statement of Scott Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) [hereinafter Alvarez Statement].
102. Michelle Clark Neely, IndustrialLoan Companies Come Out of the Shadows, The
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST, July 2007, available at
http://www.stls.frb.org/publications/re/articles/?id=27 [hereinafter Neely Article]; See also
Bernard Wysocki Jr., How Broad Coalition Stymied Wal-Mart's Bid to Own a Bank, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB l16118495912296504.html.
103. Neely Article, supra note 102, at 2-3. The ongoing debate in the U.S. about the
mixing of banking and commerce revolves around "risks that far outweigh any benefit." Id.
at 3. Those perceived risks include conflicts of interest, a lack of impartiality in credit

122
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Large bank holding companies have strongly argued that parent
companies of all banking institutions should be regulated in a similar
manner, and be permitted to engage in similar activities, subject to
prudential limitations. Under current law, banks assert that ILCs put
bank holding companies at a competitive disadvantage because ILC
parent companies are not regulated as bank holding companies, and
°4
financial holding companies cannot engage in commercial activities.'
Community banks feel threatened by potential competition from
deep-pocket owners of ILCs with nationwide banking powers,
expressing significant concerns that large retail stores will harm
community banking, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, just
as small merchants and labor groups feel threatened by entry of large

decisions, the creation of monopoly power and an expansion of the federal safety net. Id at
2-3. The Neely Article notes:
Conflicts of interest could arise in a number of ways. First, a
commercially owned financial institution could grant loans to its
affiliates at below-market terms, resulting in distortions in the creditgranting process. Tying, which occurs when the provision of one
product or service is dependent on the purchase of another product or
service, is also a frequently cited concern, even though it is generally
illegal in the United States for all businesses. The use of inside
information to benefit one affiliate of a firm at the expense of outsiders
is another potential conflict of interest.
Opponents of commercially owned ILCs also express worries about a
concentration of economic power in banking that could seriously impair
competition. Public and political distrust of large companies, especially
banks, is deeply ingrained in American history and accounts for much of
the impetus for keeping banking and commerce separate. Indeed, one of
the major fears expressed about a Wal-Mart bank is the notion that it
could become a local banking monopoly, putting community banks out
of business in some small markets.

104.

Giving commercial firms access to the federal safety net-deposit
insurance and the Federal Reserve's discount window and payments
system-is yet another perceived risk, especially if these firms are not
subject to the same supervision and regulations imposed on financial
firms with federally insured depository institutions. Here, the concern is
that the bank could make loans or engage in other activities that would
benefit an affiliate or the parent, but that would threaten the solvency of
the bank. And because ILCs-which operate only under very limited
constraints-are not subject to the BHCA, their corporate parents are
not supervised to the extent those of other insured financial institutions
are, thus potentially creating an uneven competitive playing field.
(footnote omitted). Id.
Neely Article, supra note 102, at 3.
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retail stores into their communities. 105 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy
that a number of community banks have partnered with large retail
stores. 106
The FRB, in opposing ILC expansion, argues that ILCs and,
especially, their owners, are not subject to the same supervision as
commercial banks and their holding companies, and, would therefore,
pose a risk to the financial system if they became prominent.1 °7 The
FRB has particularly expressed concern that owners of ILCs, especially
large commercial firms, avoid regulations that apply to holding
10 8
company owners of "full service" insured banks.
Finally, the CRS Report noted that "some consumer groups feel
that ILCs threaten the FDIC insurance fund, and, therefore taxpayers, by
mixing banking with commerce. 10 9
III.

POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE

ILC DEBATE

A. Extend the Moratorium
In a quintessential example of kicking the can down the road,
the Congress could opt to extend the current moratorium for a yet to be
determined period of time upon its expiration on July 21, 2013. The
primary advantage of this strategy is that it avoids a confrontation, and,
for better or worse, is certainly consistent with government actions in
recent years in addressing this issue, beginning with the first FDIC ILC
moratorium in 2006. The rationale for such an extension could be based
on the conclusion that ILCs have been a declining issue in recent years,
dropping in number and size since 2006 from 58 to 34, with total ILC
assets dropping from $212.7 billion to $102.4 billion, well less than one
percent of the assets of all FDIC-insured banks. 1 0 This could also keep

105.

Id.

See also CRS Report, supra note 57, at 11 (summarizing opposition to ILC

expansion).
106. See, e.g., Small Lenders See an Ally in Costco, AM. BANKER, May 2, 2012,
available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_85/costco-mortgage-services-bigbox-retailers- 1048982-I .html.
107. See Alvarez Statement, supra note 101.
108. Id.
109. See CRS Report, supra note 57, at 11 (summarizing opposition to ILC expansion).
110. 2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 15-16. The GAO Report noted that during the

2007-2009 financial crisis, a number of the larger ILC holding companies applied and were
approved to become bank holding companies in order to take advantage of government
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lobbyists for the various parties engaged on the issue for a number of
years. Moreover, a moratorium extension will likely be acceptable to
the banking industry and the FRB to the extent it continues to prohibit
expansion of the ILC industry.
Some of the disadvantages of a moratorium extension are
obvious and others are less obvious. First, this option clearly does not
address the long-term resolution of ILCs or the basket of other BHC
Act-exempt holding companies owning FDIC-insured banks, which
make up seven percent of the total assets in the U.S. banking industry
and that were also required by Dodd-Frank to be addressed in the 2012
GAO study."' Second, a moratorium extension does not acknowledge
capital, funding and liquidity programs available to bank holding companies during the
crisis. Id. These companies included American Express Company, Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.; Morgan Stanley and GMAC Financial Services. Merrill Lynch & Co. also owned an
ILC that became part of Bank of America Corporation, a bank holding company, when it
acquired Merrill Lynch in 2008. Id. at 16
111. Id at 16. For various reasons, the BHC Act exempts from regulation certain
companies that own depository institutions; these subsidiaries are not defined as banks for
purposes of the BHC Act and thus the companies that own them are not considered bank
holding companies and are not required to comply with the BHC Act's restrictions. Only
one type of these companies-savings and loan holding companies-is subject to regulation
at the holding company level, as follows:
" Industrial loan corporations. Industrial loan corporations (IC) are
limited-service financial institutions that make loans and raise funds
by selling certificates called "investment shares" and by accepting
deposits. ILCs are distinguished from finance companies because
ILCs accept deposits in addition to making consumer loans. ILCs
also differ from commercial banks because most ILCs do not offer
demand deposit (checking) accounts. An exempt ILC either must not
engage in any activity it was not lawfully engaged in as of March 5,
1987, or must be organized under state law either extant or
contemplated by the state legislature as of March 5, 1987, requiring
ILCs to be FDIC insured and meet one of the following conditions:
(1) not accept demand deposits, (2) have total assets of less than $100
million, or (3) not have been acquired after August 10, 1987. 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2006).
" Limited-purpose credit card banks. Limited-purpose credit card
banks are generally restricted to credit card lending, can maintain
only one office that accepts deposits, cannot accept demand deposits
or transaction accounts, do not accept savings or time deposits of less
than $100,000 (unless used as collateral for extensions of credit), and
do not engage in the business of making commercial loans (other than
small business loans).
" Municipal deposit banks. Municipal deposit banks are state-chartered
institutions that are wholly owned by thrift institutions or savings
banks and restrict themselves to acceptance of deposits from thrift
institutions or savings banks, deposits arising out of the corporate
business of their owners, and deposits of public monies. The BHC
Act does not exempt municipal deposit banks from the definition of
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the international competitive aspects of the mixing of commercial and
banking businesses in other countries with well-developed banking
systems. Third, it does not acknowledge the relatively successful safety
and soundness track record of ILC ownership by nonfinancial
companies. 12 Fourth, it ignores the clear views of the Treasury
Blueprint on this issue, which seemed to consider the issue as one of
establishing the appropriate level and type of prudential "firewalls"
governing a bank's affiliate relationships with its commercial parent
"bank." Instead, companies that own or control municipal deposit
banks are not defined as bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. §
1841(a)(5)(E) (2006).
For purposes of this report, however,
municipal deposit banks are referred to as exempt institutions. These
banks have generally not fallen within the debate on holding
company regulation since they are generally owned by bank or
savings and loans ("S&L") holding companies, and as such, 2) the
FRB has been cooperative in granting exception from the BHC Act
since they are generally viewed as divisions of their parent banks.
" Savings and loans or thrifts. S&Ls or thrifts are institutions that
traditionally accepted deposits to channel funds primarily into
residential mortgages. More recently, these institutions' charters
have been expanded to allow them to provide commercial loans and a
broader range of consumer financial services. The BHC Act defines
exempt S&L associations as (1) any federal savings association or
federal savings bank; (2) any building and loan association, savings
and loan association, homestead association, or cooperative bank if
such association or cooperative bank is a member of the Deposit
Insurance Fund; or (3) any savings bank or cooperative bank that was
previously deemed by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
to be a savings association under Section 10(1) of the Home Owners'
Loan Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(c)(2)(B) (2006); 18410) (2006). A
residential mortgage is a document signed by a borrower when a
home loan is made that gives the lender a right to take possession of
the property if the borrower fails to pay off the loan. As discussed in
detail later in this report, S&L holding companies are regulated by the
FRB and are subject to restrictions on the activities they conduct.
" Trust banks. Trust banks are institutions that function solely in a
fiduciary capacity. All or substantially all of the deposits of such
institutions must be in trust funds. Trust banks must not permit
insured deposits to be marketed through affiliates and may not accept
demand deposits. Trust banks may not obtain payment services or
borrowing privileges from the FRB. For this study, we identified
only those trust banks that fell under the BHC Act exemption, (12
U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D)) and that accept insured deposits. Serving in
a fiduciary capacity includes serving as trustee, executor, custodian,
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, or
committee of estates and incompetents.
Dodd-Frank excluded
companies that control limited-purpose trust savings associations
from regulation as S&L holding companies.
2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 2-3.
112. See FDIC Study, supra note 3, at 11-13 (detailing the history of ILC failures).
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company and its affiliates, rather than a fundamental concern about
mixing banking and commerce." 3 Finally, this approach may presume
that continued moratoriums may render ILCs a non-issue, i.e., to the
extent it presumes that ILCs will likely disappear at some point. There
is no empirical evidence to support this premise, however, and ILC
industry assets, even under a continued moratorium, could grow.14
B. Let the MoratoriumExpire
1. Permit only financial services companies to acquire or charter ILCs
Permitting only companies that are engaged in financially
related activities to acquire or charter ILCs seems to only heighten the
potential charge of regulatory arbitrage in bank holding company
regulation raised by the FRB and the banking industry. To critics,
justifying the ILC charter on the basis of "bank-centric" supervisory
oversight without consolidated oversight powers of a financial company
parent will be read to mean holding company "lite" regulation despite
the FDIC's fairly successful track record to date regulating ILCs." 5
While bank charter choice and a dual banking system remain central
features of the U.S. banking system, choice of bank holding company
regulation and regulator has been virtually eliminated under DoddFrank, other than the current exemptions to the BHC Act.16 Further,
this approach clearly does not address the main issue: whether
nonfinancial, i.e., commercial firms should be permitted to own banks.
However, options exist that would permit all companies to
acquire or charter ILCs and permit financial holding companies to
engage in certain "nonfinancial" activities

113.

Treasury Blueprint, supra note 70, at 203. See discussion supra Parts II.F.

114.

2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 15 (noting that regulators considered the ILC

moratorium to be the most important factor in the decline in ILC institutions and assets
since 2006).
115. It has been argued that the now-defunct OTS utilized this approach in its holding
company supervision, a premise that formed part of Congress's reasoning in eliminating the
agency under Dodd-Frank. See FDIC Study supra note 3.
116. See 2012 GAO Study, supra note 94, at 2-3. Dodd-Frank eliminated the OTS, and
oversight of S&L holding companies was transferred to the FRB. See 12 U.S.C. § 5412
(Supp. V 2011).
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2. Provide FDIC consolidated supervisory powers over ILC parent
companies
This approach seems consistent with one of the proposals in the
2012 GAO Study.' 17 Providing the FDIC with a level of supervisory
power similar to the FRB over ILC parent companies would certainly be
viewed as enhancing regulatory consistency in bank holding company
regulation. However, it would still pose the "challenges" that both the
FDIC and FRB have raised about how to regulate nonfinancial
companies. Perhaps more significantly, this approach does not address
the disparity in permissible activities that concerns the banking industry,
i.e., ILC parent companies may engage in nonfinancial activities, while
FRB regulated bank and financial holding companies may not. Finally,
the FRB may likely argue that this approach is inconsistent with its
consolidated bank holding company supervisor role under Dodd-Frank.
3. Require intermediate holding companies
Dodd-Frank provides that in the case of FRB-supervised
nonfinancial companies that are not subject to the limitations on
nonfinancial activities,' 18 the FRB may require the company to establish
and conduct all or a portion of its permissible financial activities in or
through an intermediate holding company (IHC) subsidiary interposed
between the bank and its nonfinancial parent company." 9 The FRB
also may require any FRB-supervised nonbank financial company to
establish an IHC if the FRB determines it necessary for appropriate
supervision of the company's financial activities or to ensure that FRB
supervision does not extend to the commercial activities of the nonbank
company.' 20 The FRB has a mandate "promulgate regulations to
establish criteria for determining when IHCs will be required."''
A company that directly or indirectly controls an IHC is

117. See 2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 43.
118. For example, a number of S&L holding companies regulated by the FRB are
grandfathered under the GLBA, and may engage in nonfinancial activities.
119. See 12U.S.C. § 1467b(Supp.V 2011).
120. Id.
121. See Melanie L. Fein, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: Provisions Affecting Bank Holding Companies 14 (2010), available at

http://www.feinlawoffices.com/images/2010-Dodd-Frank-Act-bhcs.pdf.
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required to serve as a source of strength to its subsidiary IHC. The FRB
may require reports from the parent company of an IHC solely for
purposes of assessing the company's ability to serve as a source of
22
strength to its subsidiary and to enforce compliance. 1
Given the current use of IHCs, the question is whether the
banking and ILC industries can agree on the use of IHCs to permit
companies engaged primarily in nonfinancial activities to own banks,
and, perhaps more significantly, permit a financial holding company to
engage in nonfinancial activities through an IHC. More importantly,
even if the industries agreed on this approach, it is unclear whether
Congress and the FRB ultimately can be convinced that mixing banking
and commerce through the use of the IHC is sound public policy. Until
the current regulatory climate in the wake of the financial crisis and the
landmark Dodd-Frank reform legislation subsides, this is likely to be a
tough sell, but the relative merits from a competitive, regulatory and
industry perspective maybe compelling in the longer term.
4. Redefine "financial in nature" under 4(k) of the BHC Act and permit
certain retail activities for financial holding companies
The GLBA was designed to bring peace to the financial services
world by permitting the mixing of banking, insurance, and securities
activities i.e., "financially related activities." In considering GLBA,
however, legislators, financial services regulators, and financial industry
trade groups, also seemed to agree at that time on one longstanding
activity restriction engrained in banking regulation: no mixing of
"financial services" and "commerce."'' 23 In doing so, the GLBA
purported to maintain a Maginot Line between financial services and
commerce.
Meanwhile, over the last forty years commercial companies of
all types have been entering the financial services business. As early as
the 1960s, retail stores began to issue store credit cards, cash checks,
and lend money on lay away plans, and auto companies and dealers
Retail and manufacturing
began to finance auto purchases. 124
122. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467b (Supp. V 2011).
123. See, e.g., Christine Blair, The Mixing of Banking and Commerce: Current Policy
Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REv. 97 (Jan. 2005).
124. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PRACTICES OF THE
CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY IN SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
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companies of all types began to increasingly provide financial
services. 125 As a result, the reality for bankers is that the retail industry
is emerging as formidable competitors in key areas of financial services,
including how money is lent, transmitted, and handled. Further, many
retail companies are also on the cutting edge of mobile payment
26
systems.1
As with all thorny issues, there are no easy answers, but a few
relevant questions to ponder. First, even bankers will agree, the
"business of financial services" and "financially related" activities under
the BHCA is, and by law, is intended to be an evolving concept. As
promulgated in the GLBA, "financially related" was initially identified
in 1999 as the banking, insurance, merchant banking, and securities
business. 127 The GLBA amendments to the BHC Act provide for the
potential expansion and evolution regarding what constitutes
"financially related" activities, and provided a broader possibility of
activities that are "complementary" to financial related activities. 128
Even without banking charters, most retail companies engage to some
degree in a variety of financial activities, including lending and
transactional money handling activities.
Further, a number of
nonfinancial companies continue to conduct banking activities through
the ILC "loophole" and a laundry list of the other grandfathered legal
loopholes such as unitary S&L holding companies, non-bank banks,
trust banks and so-called "CEBA" banks cited in the 2012 GAO
129
Study.
CONSUMER DEBT AND INSOLVENCY 4-6 (June 2006).

125.
126.

Id.
See Sean Sposito, PayPal Becomes a Contender at the Point of Sale with Home

Depot
Pact,
AM.
BANKER,
Jan.
9,
2012,
available
at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_6/paypal-mobile-payments-home-depot1045552-1.html; Somini Sengupta, The Post-Cash,Post-Credit-CardEconomy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sunday Review, Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/sunday-review/thepost-cash-post-credit-card-economy.html?_r-0; Jon Fingas, PayPallines up 15 retailersfor
mobile payments, will let you buy Jamba Juice smoothies with a smartphone, ENGADGET
May 25, 2012, http://www.engadget.com/2012/05/25/paypal-lines-up-15-retailers-formobile-payments/
127. See H.R. REP. No. 106-439 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
128. See 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2006) (as amended by Section 103(a) of the GLBA). The
BHCA permits the FRB and Treasury to jointly agree as to what activities may be added to
the list of permissible financially related activities. Id.
129. See 2012 GAO Study, supra note 87, at 48. See also FDIC Study, supra note 3.
So-called "CEBA" banks are institutions chartered under the Competitive Equality Banking
Act ("CEBA") of 1987. A CEBA bank is not a "bank" for purposes of the BHC Act if it
engages "only in credit card operations" and does not: (1) accept demand deposits or other
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A number of commercial companies have a ready and loyal
customer base to cross-sell financial products and services and want to
cut costs associated with fees they currently pay to banks for credit card,
check cashing, money transmission and other money handling
transactions on behalf of their customers. Large retailers also may want
a multistate, full-service banking operation based in their retail stores,
or want to own and operate banks for purposes of limited product lines,
such as auto lending. Finally, some want to access federal deposit
insurance and offer their customers deposit taking services.
In light of the foregoing, one possible approach is to expand the
category of, and build more flexibility into the definition of "financially
related," and permit some activities of commercial firms under the BHC
Act to qualify as financially related activities, with appropriate
structural and prudential safeguards as the industries involved continue
to evolve their business models. This approach is consistent with the
history of banking regulation in expanding the scope of permissible
activities of bank holding companies and their affiliates while giving
due regard to prudential safeguards.
The recent history of permitting activities that had previously
been considered "non-banking" within bank regulatory schemes
arguably supports this evolutionary approach. For example, the GLBA
repealed section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall
Act), 130 which had previously prohibited a bank or its affiliates from
engaging in the underwriting of securities. 1 31 Specifically, former
section 20 prohibited any bank which is a member of the Federal
Reserve System (including all national banks and state-chartered
member banks) from being affiliated with any entity that is "engaged
principally" in the "issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution, at wholesale, retail, or through syndicate participation" of
securities that the bank may not underwrite or deal in directly
132
("ineligible securities").
checking accounts; (2) accept savings or time deposits of less than $100,000, unless for
collateral on a loan; (3) maintain more than one office that accepts deposits; or (4) engage in
the business of making commercial loans.
130. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
131. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: THE GRAMMLEACH-BLILEY ACT SUMMARY (Nov. 12, 1999).

132. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999). In light of the recent financial crisis there
have been some calls for reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act. See, e.g., Andrew Ross
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In a series of actions approved between 1984 and 1997, the FRB
adopted a two-pronged approach to define the scope of permissible
activities for securities affiliates of member banks. First, the FRB ruled
that an affiliate of a member bank would be "engaged principally" in
underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities, and therefore would be
in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act, if its gross revenues from such
activities exceeded five percent-later increased to ten percent-of its
total gross revenues. 133 Second, the FRB imposed extensive firewalls,
including rules governing exposure to individual customers, crossmarketing, fiduciary purchases of securities underwritten by a Section
20 affiliate, capital adequacy, loans to customers of a securities affiliate,
34
board and officer interlocks, and disclosure of customer information.a
Securities firms whose activities satisfied these limitations and who
received FRB approval to operate as an affiliate of a member bank
'1 35
became known as "Section 20 subsidiaries" or "Section 20 affiliates."
By 1997, the FRB had further increased the gross revenue limit to
twenty-five percent.t 36 In 1999, as noted, GLBA removed all
restrictions on securities underwriting, deeming such activities
"financially related." 137 As such, over a period of years a non-banking
activity specifically prohibitedby federal law for bank affiliates became
38
a specificallypermitted activity.'
Further, another avenue would be to consider the implications of
a new class of financial company created by Dodd-Frank-any
company "predominantly" engaged in activities that the FRB
determines are financial in nature or incidental thereto, other than a
bank holding company or nonbank financial company supervised by the
FRB (Predominantly Financial Company). 139 This category includes
any subsidiary of a bank holding company or other company if the
subsidiary is predominantly engaged in such activities and is not a
Sorkin, Reinstating an Old Rule is Not a Cure for Crisis, N. Y. TIMES, May 21, 2012,

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/2 I/reinstating-an-old-rule-is-not-a-cure-for-crisis/.
133.

See Restrictions on Securities Underwriting and Dealing: Hearing Before the S.

Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (statement of Susan
M. Phillips, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.

137.

Id.
See 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2006) (as amended by Section 103(a) of the GLBA).

138.

But see supra note 129.

139.

12 U.S.C. § 5381 (Supp. V 2011).
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The term
depository institution or insurance company. 140
"predominantly" engaged in financial activities currently means that the
consolidated revenues of the company from financial activities,
including revenues from owning a depository institution, constitute
eighty-five percent or more of the company's total consolidated
revenues. 141
In addition, a "nonfinancial" company may be designated by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for supervision by the
FRB if it engages in "some" financial activities-but not
"predominantly"-and is determined by the FSOC to require
supervision by the FRB. 142 Such a company may become subject to
FRB supervision if the FSOC determines that material financial distress
related to its financial activities would pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States and that the company is organized or
operates in such a manner as to evade Board supervision.143 If such a
determination is made, the company may be required to transfer its
financial activities to an intermediate holding company for supervisory
44
purposes. 1
Under evolving regulatory standards in recent years, the
purported regulatory wall separating banking and commerce is not as
impenetrable as it may appear; in fact, as previously described in this
article, it is actually somewhat porous and has evolved over time. As
such, the foregoing discussion amply demonstrate that activities
previously considered "non-banking" activities have over time become
140.

Id.

141. Id. The only apparent consequence of falling into this category is that the company
may become subject to an orderly liquidation process administered by the FDIC if it fails.
The process is triggered if the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President
of the United States, makes a determination that the company's failure would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States. See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (Supp. V
2011).

142.

12 U.S.C.

143.

Id.

§ 5323(c) (Supp. V2011).

144. The coverage of these companies under FRB supervision is mainly an "antievasion" measure designed to prevent nonbank financial companies from structuring their
operations so as to evade FRB supervision. The FRB has stated that such evasion may
occur, for example, if a large, interconnected company that is predominantly engaged in
financial activities slightly alters the manner in which it conducts an activity that is financial
in nature so that the activity does not comply with one of the restrictions that govern the
conduct of the activity by a bank holding company for the purpose of reducing the
company's financial revenues and assets and avoiding designation by the FSOC as a
nonbank financial company supervised by the FRB. See 76 Fed. Reg. 7731, 7736 (Feb. 11,
2011).
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permissible "financially related" activities; nonfinancial companies
engaging in financial activities may now become subject to bank
holding company regulation pursuant to Dodd-Frank; and similarly,
financial companies do not need to be linked solely to "financially
related" activities.
Accordingly, in light of the above described recent legal and
policy developments regarding the interpretation of the scope of
permissible banking and "financial activities," it is no quantum leap in
analysis to identify a financial company regulatory model that permits
"financial holding companies," as defined under current law to engage
in a specified level of "non-financial activities." The Predominantly
Financial Company standards and the evolution of non-banking
activities as financially related clearly mark this path. Further, it can be
argued that all financial companies do engage in a level of non-financial
activities that are still related to financial activities, and even if they are
not, an important question is whether there is a compelling safety and
soundness rationale that today's complex financial services companies
must be pristinely engaged solely in financial activities.
Further, this analysis also would allow for a "commercial"
company's activities to be closely analyzed to determine what
components of its activities are actually financial in nature, and where a
specified level of financially related activities are present, permit such
companies to potentially own not just ILCs but any federally insured
depository institutions. For example, major components of the business
and sales activities of most, if not all, retail and commercial companies
currently owning or controlling ILCs are clearly financial activities:
consumer and commercial credit, debit, prepaid and gift card
operations, layaway, consumer, small business and secured lending,
check cashing and printing, online bill payment and account services,
money order and wire transfer and tax preparation services, 145 and even
mortgage lending. 146 It may be argued that such financial activities in
most cases constitute a substantial if not predominantly component of
the business operations of such companies. As such, why can't such
companies be considered financial companies, i.e., Predominately
145.

See, e.g., WalMart MoneyCenter, www.walmart.com/cp/walmart-money-center;

The
Home
Depot
Credit
Center,
www.homedepot.com/catalog/servletlcontentview?pn=CreditCenter; TARGET REDcard,
www.target.com/redcard.
146. See GMAC Mortgage, www.gmacmortgage.com.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 17

Financial Company standards?
5. Leave oversight of small, less complex ILCs with FDIC and transfer
oversight of large complex ILCs to the FRB
This is another potential option proposed by the 2012 GAO
Study. On the one hand, it may satisfy the concerns of the banking
industry and the FRB by leveling the regulatory playing field for
holding company regulation of larger ILCs and their parent companies.
However, the FRB will still likely argue its primary role is as a
consolidated bank holding company supervisor, and that there is a
contained, but substantial likelihood of regulatory arbitrage with more
Further, it still does not
than one holding company regulator.
specifically address the question of how to regulate a commercial
company that owns a bank. Use of the [HC and increased oversight of
affiliate relationships may be productive alternatives.
V. CONCLUSION

What happens next is anyone's guess. No party to the debate
will disagree that only those companies engaging in safe and sound
banking activities well-insulated from parents, affiliates, and
subsidiaries should be in a position to obtain deposit insurance. Deposit
insurance is ultimately backed by the U.S. taxpayer, so the deposit
insurance system should always be positioned such that deposit
insurance is not a "heads I win, tails you lose" proposition from a moral
hazard perspective.
Both financial services companies and commercial companies
engaged in-or wishing to engage in-financial activities may do well
to consider the famous phrase "one day I looked at the enemy and they
were us." Legislators and regulators often are fighting the last war, so
to speak, and the big question is whether there will-or should be-a
reconciliation of evolving marketplace realities, competitive issues, and
safety and soundness concerns in this area to mutual advantage for
banking and commercial companies.
The foregoing discussion points out only a few possibilities for
enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. companies engaged in
financially related activities while addressing regulatory and
competitiveness concerns. Ultimately, the stomach for mixing what has
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been traditionally characterized as "banking" and "commerce" may
depend on the regulatory climate, the interests of the ILC industry to
protect its status, and the interest of the banking industry to limit
competition or for that matter, pursue commercial activities.
While longstanding arguments continue to be made about the
need for the separation of baking and commerce, the fact of the matter is
that the marketplace-and even the banking laws in landmark reform
regulation such as Dodd-Frank-show a different reality evolving
where the lines between financial and commercial activities have
become blurred. The lifting of the ILC moratorium provides a perfect
opportunity to assess these businesses and competitive developments
and further refine a regulatory approach to the continuing trend of
financial and commercial activities becoming more closely related by
the day.

